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uploaded by third-parties and printed onto products by Zazzle infringed 35 different copyrighted
works owned by Plaintiff. The case was tried on August 8-9, 2017.
The Trial
At trial, Plaintiff did not argue that Zazzle had actual knowledge that it was infringing the
works at issue. Nor did Plaintiff present any evidence to show that ignored any infringement.
The testimony was as follows.
Zazzle had an express policy against infringing activity. See, e.g., Dkt. 120 at 120:21121:4. Plaintiff presented no evidence of deviation from that policy. Zazzle this policy by
requiring anyone uding the Zazzle service to contractually promise that they would not upload
any infringing designs. Dkt. 120 at 130:24-131:9. Zazzle also required its users to contractually
warrant and verify that they had the right to use each individual image. Dkt. 120 at 120:21-121:4.
Zazzle also employed 30 and 50 people to help Zazzle enforce its policy. Dkt. 120 at 90:2-92:11;
102:14-102:25.
Evidence at trial showed that every time that Zazzle was notified of an alleged
infringement, it removed that product from its website. Plaintiff agreed that every time it brought
potential infringements to Zazzle’s attention, Zazzle swiftly removed the alleged infringements.
See Tr. Exs. 142-143, 144-145, 146-147, 148-151, 152-154, 159-160, 164; Dkt. 120 at 56:2457:7, 85:18-20; see also Dkt. 120 at 56:24-57:7(“[Q:] And every time you sent in notices, Zazzle
took them down? [A:] That’s correct.”), 85:18-20 (“[Q:] Mr. Young, you had testified that
Zazzle.com always took down your images when you gave them notice, correct? [A:] That’s
correct.”). Zazzle’s witness confirmed this testimony as well. Dkt. 120 at 132:2-132:14.
At one point in time, Zazzle made a specific effort to try to remove all products that
might potentially infringe Plaintiff’s copyrights by using keyword searches to try to find those
products and remove them. See Dkt. 120 at 20:21-21:12, 114:18-116:18; Tr. Exs. 143, 151. In
response, Plaintiff thanked Zazzle “for all of [its] hard work in clearing off the infringements,”
and stated that it was “pleased with the response and the work you have done.” Tr. Ex. 153.
Plaintiff’s ongoing concern was that other third-party users continued to upload its images to
Zazzle and Zazzle did not proactively takedown the images. Plaintiff showed that it had to
continue sending takedown notices to combat these new images.
The Jury Verdict
After both sides rested at trial, Zazzle made an oral motion under Rule 50(a) for judgment
as a matter of law on the question of willfulness. Dkt. 122. The Court did not rule on the motion
and instead gave a willfulness instruction to the jury. Dkt. 131. The jury returned its verdict on
August 9, awarding separate damages awards for each of the 35 copyrights at issue. Dkt. 129.
The awards ranged from $200 to $66,800. Dkt. 129. The normal range of statutory damages is
$750 to $30,000 per work infringed; “innocent” infringement can reduce the minimum to $200,
and “willful” infringement can increase the maximum to $150,000. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). For
this motion, Zazzle is concerned about five specific awards: On Question #7 (CS37 – Visit
Cuba), the jury awarded $36,000; on Question #10 (CS46 – San Francisco), the jury awarded
$49,500; on Question #24 (CS78 – San Francisco), the jury awarded $65,000; on Question #27
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(CS81 – Napa Valley), the jury awarded $66,800; and on Question #31 (CS99 – Havana), the
jury awarded $42,400. Dkt. 129. The Court entered judgment on the verdict on August 10, 2017.
Dkt. 123.
III.

ANALYSIS
a. Standard of Review

Judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b) “should be granted if the evidence
permits only one conclusion and that conclusion is contrary to the jury’s verdict.” Martin v. Cal.
Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 560 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Ostad v. Oregon Health
Scis. Univ., 327 F.3d 876, 881 (9th Cir. 2003). The central inquiry in a Rule 50(b) motion is
whether there is “substantial evidence” to support the verdict. Landes Constr. Co. v. Royal Bank
of Canada, 833 F.2d 1365, 1371 (9th Cir. 1987). Substantial evidence is present only if
reasonable minds can accept the evidence as adequate to support the conclusion. Id.
The court should draw inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, but only if those
inferences are “reasonable.” Acosta v. City of Costa Mesa, 718 F.3d 800, 828 (9th Cir. 2013). An
inference is not reasonable if it is “supported by only threadbare conclusory statements instead of
significant probative evidence.” Lakeside-Scott v. Multnomah Cty., 556 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir.
2009) (quoting Barnes v. Arden Mayfair, Inc., 759 F.2d 676, 680–81 (9th Cir. 1985)). And
judgment as a matter of law “is appropriate when the jury could have relied only on speculation
to reach its verdict.” Lakeside-Scott, 556 F.3d at 802.
Where identifiable sums included in the verdict should not have been included as a matter
of law, the court may reduce the awarded damages. See Plumbers & Steamfitters Union v.
Dillion, 255 F.2d 820, 824 (9th Cir. 1958). If the court reduces damages pursuant to a Rule 50
motion for judgment, it may do so unilaterally without offering the option of a new trial
(remittitur). See Club 93, Inc. v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, N.A., 178 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1999)
(upholding reduction in damage award without a new trial).
b. Willfulness Requires Actual Knowledge, Recklessness, or Willful Blindness

A copyright owner can only recover damages in excess of $30,000 per infringed work if
the infringement was “willful.” 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). “The copyright owner has the burden of
proving willfulness.” Friedman v. Live Nation Merch., Inc., 833 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2016).
As set forth in a series of recent Ninth Circuit decisions in a variety of copyright contexts,
“willful infringement does not require … actual knowledge; a showing of recklessness or willful
blindness is sufficient.” See, e.g., Unicolors, Inc. v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 853 F.3d 980, 992
(9th Cir. 2017).1 Pursuant to this standard, a copyright defendant may be liable for willful
infringement if it fails to make any “attempt to check or inquire into” the copyright status of a
design when it “has a general awareness” that the design might be unauthorized, Unicolors, Inc.,
853 F.3d at 991-992, or if the defendant uses “an approval process that never explicitly asks
1

GYPI does not argue that Zazzle “as a matter of policy” failed to investigate infringement. GYPI’s argument as to
Unicolors is that Zazzle did not “meaningfully” check into copyrights. Dkt. 150 at 17:7-24. The insertion of
“meaningfully” ignores the actual reasoning of Unicolors, which concerned a company that did not attempt any
investigation even though infringement was obviously likely. Plaintiffs made no allegation or showing of fact at trial
that Zazzle’s conduct met that standard.
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about copyrights at all,” Friedman, Inc., 833 F.3d at 1186, or if the defendant deliberately sells
infringing products after receiving a cease-and-desist notice. Wash. Shoe Co., 704 F.3d at 674.
But in contrast to these cases, willful infringement does not exist as a matter of law
where, as here, the defendant relies on a third party’s representation that the third party can
authorize the defendant to use the work and the defendant is aware of no facts to suspect
infringement. Taylor Holland LLC v. MVMT Watches, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-03578-SVW-JC, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187379, at *27 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2016). In Taylor Holland, this Court
determined that willful infringement could not be shown as a matter of law where a third party
supplied the defendant with a copyrighted photograph and falsely represented that she had the
right to authorize the defendant to use the image.2 The Court recognized that a failure to act with
“prudence” is “not the same as” “reckless disregard and willful blindness.” Id. at *29 n.24.
And with respect to online service providers that host large volumes of user-uploaded
content, receiving a takedown request for a specific unauthorized copy of a copyrighted work
does not, without more, impute an objective suspicion that other instances of that same work
exist on the service and are likewise unauthorized. Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 940 F.
Supp. 2d 110, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). “[W]illful blindness is not the same as an affirmative duty to
monitor [the service for other instances of infringement].” Id. Absent a takedown notice from a
copyright owner identifying specific infringing copy, the service provider cannot know whether
every particular copy is authorized or not. Id. at 116-117 (where defendant had “at most
information that infringements were occurring with particular works, and occasional indications
of promising areas to locate and remove them,” but not the “specific locations of infringements,”
then “[t]here is no showing of willful blindness to specific infringements”).
c. Zazzle’s Conduct Was Neither Reckless Nor Willfully Blind

Here, as in Taylor Holland and in Evergreen, there is insufficient evidence as a matter of
law to support a finding that Zazzle willfully infringed the copyrights at issue. To the contrary,
the undisputed trial evidence refutes any such suggestion because Zazzle (1) adopted a policy
against copyright infringement, (2) required its users to contractually warrant that each design’s
use was authorized, (3) employed a large team to help enforce its policy, (4) responded to every
one of Plaintiff’s takedown requests, and (5) made an effort to try to locate and remove
additional infringements from Plaintiff’s catalogue.
Plaintiff argues that its non-exclusive willfulness factors—taken from the jury
instructions—support a finding of willfulness by the jury. Zazzle does not dispute the
instructions themselves. Zazzle argues that Plaintiff did not produce the requisite evidence
during trial to meet those factors. Under Ninth Circuit law, simply selling copyrighted works is
not enough to find willfulness, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion. The instruction included whether
defendant “did anything to determine if the product was infringing, apart from relying upon the
representations of the product’s supplier.” Dkt. 131 at 22:14-15. Plaintiff never addressed the
undisputed testimony that Zazzle would reach out for additional information where it doubted
the uploaders had the relevant rights. Dkt. 120 at 121:5-121:14, 134:5-10. The instruction
2

The Court continues that lthough the defendant could have uncovered the truth had it inquired and investigated the
issue, there was “no other evidence that could lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that [the defendant] should
have been suspicious about the origin or rights to the Photograph.” Id. at *28
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included whether defendant “had any procedures or policies to prevent the sale of infringing
goods.” Dkt. 131 at 22:16-17. Plaintiff acknowledges that there were policies in place, even
though the policies may not have flagged every new instance of copyright infringement on the
platform. Even in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Zazzle’s conduct was not “so
unreasonable as to constitute reckless disregard.” Island Software & Computer Serv., 413 F.3d at
264.
Drawing reasonable inferences in Planitiff’s favor, Zazzle’s conduct cannot be
considered reckless or willfully blind. Whenever Plaintiff gave Zazzle notice of infringement,
Zazzle responded. Planitiff’s closing arguments acknowledged Zazzle had a working antiinfringement system. Dkt. 147 at 116:8-11 (“[GYPI is] asking you to get Zazzle to do a better
job.”) While that system admittedly could not address future infringement, it did have the ability
to remove infringing material upon receipt of a takedown notice. And the Ninth Circuit does not
set the willfulness bar so low that it requires active monitoring for infringement in the online
platform context.
Even in the light most favorable to Planitiff, the undisputed facts do not show
recklessness. Zazzle indisputably reviewed product orders and employed dozens of people to
combat infringement. Nor was there evidence to support “willful blindness.” Plaintiff elicited no
testimony that Zazzle “believed that there is a high probability” of infringement of Plaintiff’s
copyrights, and Plaintiff showed no “deliberate actions” by Zazzle “to avoid learning” about
infringement. Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc., 563 U.S. at 769–70. Both elements are required;
Plaintiff showed neither at trial.
No caselaw supports a willfulness standard so low that a company with an active antiinfringement policy that took action against any alleged infringement—albeit upon receiving
notice—is deemed to have acted recklessly or been willfully blind. This Court enters judgment
as a matter of law that any infringement found by the jury was not “willful.”
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Court GRANTS Defendant Zazzle’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of
law and accordingly reduces the five statutory damages awards that exceed the statutory
maximum for non-willful infringement to $30,000 each pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
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